We propose a model of equilibrium contracting between two agents who are "boundedly rational" in the sense that they face time-costs of deliberating current and future transactions. We show that equilibrium contracts may be incomplete and assign control rights: they may leave some enforceable future transactions unspecified and instead specify which agent has the right to decide these transactions. Control rights allow the controlling agent to defer time-consuming deliberations on those transactions to a later date, making her less inclined to prolong negotiations over an initial incomplete contract. Still, agents tend to resolve conflicts up-front by writing more complete initial contracts. A more complete contract can take the form of either a finer adaptation to future contingencies, or greater coarseness. Either way, conflicts among contracting agents tend to result in excessively complete contracts in the sense that the maximization of joint payoffs would result in less up-front deliberation.
Introduction
This paper analyzes a contracting model with two agents, each facing thinking costs, in which equilibrium incomplete contracts arise endogenously. The basic situation we model is an investment in a partnership or an ongoing new venture. The contract the agents write speci…es in a more or less complete manner what action-plan they agree to undertake initially, and how the proceeds from the venture are to be shared. In any given state of nature both agents face costs in thinking through optimal decisions in that state. Therefore an optimal contract that maximizes gains from trade net of thinking costs is generally incomplete in the sense that it is not based on all the information potentially available to agents in all states of nature. By introducing positive thinking or deliberation costs into an otherwise standard contracting framework, it is thus possible to formulate a theory of endogenously incomplete contracts.
As Oliver Hart and others have observed, to understand why contracts are incomplete and what determines the degree of incompleteness of contracts one ultimately needs to appeal to the contracting agents'bounded rationality:
"In reality, a great deal of contractual incompleteness is undoubtedly linked to the inability of agents not only to contract very carefully about the future, but also to think very carefully about the utility consequences of their actions. It would therefore be highly desirable to relax the assumption that agents are unboundedly rational." [Hart, 1995, p. 81] The only departure from full rationality we explore in this article is time-costs in thinking through optimal transactions. 1 As will become clear in the formal analysis below, even such a minimal departure introduces major new conceptual issues. But in spite of these complications our quasi-rational model captures several important features of incomplete contracting observed in practice.
One …rst basic result is that boundedly rational agents write what we call satis…cing contracts, which do not fully exploit all gains from trade that would be available to agents 1 We develop the model of decision-making with positive deliberation costs more fully in Bolton and FaureGrimaud (2008) . Our model builds on earlier work on decision-making with deliberation costs by Simon (1955) and Conlisk (1980 Conlisk ( , 1988 Conlisk ( , 1996 among others, and on the literature on multiarmed bandits by Gittins and Jones (1974) , Rothschild (1974) , Gittins (1979) , Berry and Frystedt (1985) and Whittle (1980 Whittle ( , 1982 . 1 who face no deliberation costs. 2 In equilibrium, agents don't waste time resolving all future transactions and instead leave many decisions to be determined later. Agents will tend to settle on more incomplete action-plans when they have broadly aligned interests, and when they all expect to bene…t substantially from the deal. Note, in particular, that boundedly rational agents choose to leave transactions unresolved in perfectly foreseeable, describable and enforceable contingencies, if these contingencies are su¢ ciently unlikely or distant, or if they don't a¤ect expected payo¤s much. In addition, contracts become more and more detailed over time, as agents complete the contract in light of new information.
We refer to such contracts as incomplete contracts to the extent that they do not involve complete ex-ante information acquisition on payo¤s of all transactions in all states, and they do not just specify state-contingent transactions based only on the information agents have acquired ex ante. Contracts can always be made contingent on all the information available to the contracting parties and in that sense contracts can always be complete. That said, when agents choose to defer information acquisition on certain transactions to when a given state of nature arises, they may as well write what is more commonly referred to as an incomplete contract, namely a contract where the ultimate transaction to be undertaken in that state is left unspeci…ed and where a controlling agent has the right to determine the transaction should that state of nature arise (see Grossman and Hart, 1986, and Hart and Moore, 1988) . Such an incomplete contract would often yield the same expected payo¤ as an optimal contract that is based on all the information agents choose to acquire in a particular state, and would be a lot simpler to write.
The main results from our analysis are as follows: First, incomplete contracts specifying control rights may emerge in equilibrium (when such contracts are not strictly dominated by a complete contract with the same equilibrium information acquisition). The rationale for control rights in our model -de…ned as rights to decide between di¤erent transactions in contingencies left out of the initial contract -is that the holder of these rights bene…ts by having the option to defer thinking about future decisions. Second, control rights tend to be allocated to the more cautious party. Indeed, the more cautious party is then more willing to close the deal quickly, even though it has not had the time to think through all contingencies, in the knowledge that thanks to its control rights it can impose its most favored decision in the unexplored contingencies.
Third, the sharp distinction between a …rst contract negotiation phase followed by a phase of execution of the contract usually made in the contract theory literature is no longer justi…ed in our setup. Contracts are completed over time and negotiations about aspects that have been left out initially can be ongoing. In particular, the contracting agents may choose to begin negotiations by writing a preliminary contract specifying the broad outlines of a deal and committing the agents to the deal. The agents then continue with a further exploration phase (which may be thought of as a form of due diligence) before deciding whether to go ahead with the venture and agreeing to a detailed contract. Interestingly, a party with all the bargaining power may choose to leave rents to the other party, so as to meet its prior aspiration level -that is, the level before it has had time to think through all contingencies -and thus persuade it to sign on more quickly.
Fourth, when agents'objectives con ‡ict more, equilibrium contracts are more complete.
The main reason is that each agent may be concerned about the detrimental exercise of control by the other agent, so that abuse of power cannot be limited by just allocating control to the agent that is least likely to abuse power. In such situations the exercise of control may have to be circumscribed contractually by writing more complete contracts.
Another reason is that when agents have con ‡icting goals they are less willing to truthfully share their thoughts, so that the net bene…t of leaving transactions to be …ne-tuned later is reduced.
This analysis thus provides new foundations for incomplete contracts and the role of control rights. In our model equilibrium contracts may be incomplete even though more complete contracts (relying on more information acquisition) are enforceable. Similarly, contractual completeness increases over time even though enforceability remains unchanged. This is in our view a critical di¤erence with …rst generation models of incomplete contracts.
Two important implications immediately follow. First, our framework allows for contractual innovation by the contracting agents independently of any changes in legal enforcement. Second, changes in legal enforcement may have no e¤ect on equilibrium contracts if enforcement constraints were not binding in the …rst place.
There can be substantial contractual innovation unprompted by changes in legal enforcement as, Kaplan, Martel, and Stromberg (2007) have strikingly documented. In their study they track the evolution of venture capital (VC) contracts in over twenty countries outside the U.S. and compare them to U.S. VC contracts. A key …nding is that although contracts di¤er across jurisdictions, and thus seem at …rst sight to be constrained by local legal enforcement, the more experienced VCs end up writing the same U.S.-style contracts independently of the local legal environment. Bienz and Walz (2008) provide other empirical support and …nd that exit rights for VCs are generally only written into the contract at later …nancing rounds, consistent with our hypothesis that VCs focus on exit rights only once exit issues become more pressing. They also …nd that older, hence more experienced, VCs write more complete contracts by including more control rights clauses into contracts. Another common VC contracting practice they highlight is the use of "term sheets", a form of preliminary contract containing general clauses of the form "other terms and conditions customary to venture capital …nancing will apply".
In the …rst generation models of incomplete contracting theories a la Grossman and Hart (1986) and Hart and Moore (1988) agents are fully rational but unable to contractually specify transactions in some states of nature due to exogenous veri…ability or describability constraints. Being fully rational, agents will always write the most complete contract they can, and contractual e¢ ciency is always constrained by enforcement e¤ectiveness. Moreover, since contract incompleteness is entirely driven by exogenous enforcement constraints, the contracting agents are unable to limit discretion contractually and are reduced to only determining optimal control allocations over decisions that cannot be written into the contract.
Except that, as Maskin and Tirole (1999) have observed, rational agents may actually be able to write complete contracts by circumventing enforcement constraints through sophisticated Maskin (revelation) schemes.
Our analysis is closely related to a second generation of incomplete contracting theories, which includes Anderlini and Felli (1994 , 1999 , Al Najjar, Felli (2002), MacLeod (2000) , Battigalli and Maggi (2002) , Bajari and Tadelis (2001), and Hart and Moore (2007) . 3 These studies also provide theories of endogenous contractual incompleteness, but based on other transaction costs, such as costs of writing detailed contracts, or limits on language in describing certain transactions or contingencies. In closely related independent work, Tirole (2008) also considers contracting between two boundedly rational agents. Contracts in his set-up always specify a given action to be taken, but they are less likely to be renegotiated (more complete) when contracting agents have incurred larger cognitive costs. Although the basic setup he considers is quite di¤erent from ours, similar themes and results emerge, such as the endogenous incompleteness of contracts and the ex-3 See also the earlier theory of Dye (1985) . This is the main reason why contracts tend to be excessively complete.
Finally, our model and the second generation theories can be seen as attempts to formalize di¤erent aspects of Williamson's (1979 Williamson's ( , 1985 transactions costs theory. As Williamson has forcefully argued, contracts in reality are likely to be incomplete primarily due to the costs of specifying transactions on paper and due to the bounded rationality of contracting agents.
Interestingly, a major theme in Williamson's theory is that a key role of organizations is to move enforcement away from courts and inside …rms, thereby dampening potential con ‡icts between agents and thus increasing the e¢ ciency of incomplete contracts. As we suggest in the conclusion, it may also be bene…cial in our framework to impose limits on the enforcement of contracts that allow the controlling party to exercise authority in an abusive way.
The paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 presents our model of contracting between two boundedly rational agents. Section 3 characterizes satis…cing contracts under the assumptions of non-transferable utility and communication of hard information. Section 4 considers extensions to communication of soft information and transferable utility. Section 5 concludes and an appendix contains the more involved proofs.
The Model
Two in…nitely-lived agents, A and B, can join forces to undertake a new venture at time t = 0. The venture requires initial funding I > 0 from each agent. If investments are sunk at date t 0 then at date t + 1 the venture ends up in one of two equally likely states:
2 f 1 ; 2 g. In state 1 the two agents get the same known payo¤ 0. In state 2 , the two agents face the collective decision of choosing between a safe and a risky action. The safe action yields known payo¤s S A and S B , while the risky action yields either (R A ; R B ) or ( R A ; R B ). To make the problem non-trivial we assume:
Thus the only uncertainty in the model is which state of nature will occur and the payo¤ of the risky action in state 2 .
At t = 0, the beginning of the game, neither agent k = A; B knows the true value of R k and each agent starts out with prior belief = Pr(R = R), which can be revised by engaging in thought-experimentation over time as follows. If agent k experiments in a given period he privately observes R k with probability k and nothing otherwise.
As long as neither agent has found out the true payo¤ of the risky action, either agent can and may want to continue to engage in thought experimentation. The agents can engage in thought experimentation before or after signing a contract, and before or after the state of nature is realized. Both agents discount future returns by the same factor 1.
Timing of the Game:
We shall make the following timing assumptions:
Technological Timing
At date 0, the agents can invest I right away or postpone investment. They can also engage in one round of thought experimentation. Investment can only be undertaken if both agents agree to invest.
Subsequent periods are essentially identical to date 0 until investment takes place. The only di¤erence is that the agents may have been able to update their beliefs about the payo¤ of the risky action in state 2 . Once investment has been completed, either state of nature 1 or 2 is realized one period later. When state 2 occurs the agents either engage in more thinking, or choose an action. Once an action has been chosen, payo¤s are realized and the game ends.
Timing of the Negotiation Game
For expositional convenience we divide each period into two stages: a …rst stage when a contract (or renegotiation) o¤er is made and possibly accepted, and a second stage as described in the technological timing above.
We make the extreme simplifying assumption that at the beginning of date 0 nature randomly gives one of the two agents (the proposer) all the bargaining power and the exclusive right to make all contract o¤ers. In each period until the contract is signed the proposer can choose to wait or o¤er a contract to the other party (the receiver), who can either accept or reject the o¤er. If no o¤er is made or if the o¤er is rejected, the game moves to the next period and starts over again. If the o¤er is accepted the agents move on with theventure. If the contract is complete, post-contractual play is fully speci…ed. If the contract is incomplete, the agents play a post-contractual game, which we describe in detail below.
Information and Contracts
We assume that at date 0 neither agent has any private information about R k and that agents' prior belief is common knowledge. In subsequent periods, however, each agent can obtain private information about their payo¤s through thought-experimentation. Each agent can elect to disclose some of that information to the other agent. We shall distinguish between the cases of hard information, in which information can be credibly disclosed, and soft information, where communication is cheap talk.
We also distinguish between two polar contracting environments: one where the agents' utility is perfectly transferable (the TU case) and the other where utility is non-transferable (the NTU case).
Throughout most of our analysis we focus on the case where utility is non-transferable and where private information can be credibly disclosed. We consider the TU case and cheap talk communication in an extension.
Assumptions on Payo¤s
We denote by k maxf R k ; S k g + (1 ) maxfR k ; S k g each party's expected payo¤ under their preferred ex-post action choice and by
the expected payo¤ of the risky action. We make the following assumptions on payo¤s throughout the analysis:
Assumption A1:
Assumption A1 guarantees that the project is valuable for both agents when the safe action is chosen in state 2 . Moreover, both agents prefer the risky over the safe action given their prior beliefs. As will become clear below, this assumption is not essential and our analysis can be extended to the case where agents prefer the safe over the risky action when they are uninformed.
We consider in turn the situations where the agents have congruent underlying objectives over which action to choose, and where they have con ‡icting objectives on the preferredaction-plan. In the …rst situation the two agents can only disagree on how quickly to act, or, in other words, on how far ahead to plan.
Satis…cing Contracts under Congruent Objectives
In this section we consider the contracting game when the two agents'objectives are congruent. We de…ne the agents' underlying preferences to be congruent when the following assumption holds:
Under assumption A2 both agents agree on the action choice once they know the true payo¤s.
The contracting game begins at date 0 with nature selecting the contract proposer. We shall take it that agent A is the proposer and B the receiver. If B accepts A's o¤er, the continuation game is dictated by the terms of the contract. If A does not make an o¤er or if B rejects the contract, then each agent engages in one round of thought experimentation and communication before moving on to the next period. In the next period again A gets to make a contract o¤er, and so on, until an o¤er is accepted by B.
The set of relevant contract o¤ers for A under our assumption that utility is not transferable can be reduced to essentially …ve contracts 4 , C = fC R ; C S ; C A ; C B ; C AB g, and any
probability distribution over C, where:
1. C R requires the immediate choice of the risky action r in state 2 following investment; 2. C S requires the immediate choice of the safe action s in state 2 following investment;
3. C A allocates all control rights to agent A following investment. The controlling party can decide which action to take in state 2 at any time she wants; 4. C B is identical to C A except that it allocates all control rights to agent B;
5. C AB is identical to C A except that it requires unanimous agreement to select an action;
Even if agents have congruent underlying preferences they may still have disagreements under incomplete information. In particular, they may have di¤erent preferences on how quickly to invest due to di¤erences in how quickly they are able to think. To see this, note …rst that when the agents engage in thought-experimentation in a given period, and share their thoughts, they uncover the true payo¤ of the risky action in a given period of time with probability:
Now, suppose that the agents …nd themselves in state 2 and are uninformed. If the two agents delay any action choice and engage in thought-experimentation until they learn the true payo¤ R k they can each expect to get:
can be interpreted as an e¤ective discount factor.
Clearly, it is possible that:
even under assumption A2. In this case the two agents disagree on the best course of action in state 2 : A prefers to take the risky action immediately, while B prefers to learn R k …rst before deciding on an action.
It is helpful to begin our analysis by studying …rst the contracting outcome when both agents have "unbounded rationality". This corresponds to two di¤erent situations in our model: either there is nothing to be learned ( = 0 or = 1) or nothing that can be learned
Two ' unbounded rationality'benchmarks
When either = 1 or = 0, the equilibrium outcome of the contracting game is to sign a contract requiring immediate investment. If = 1 the contract speci…es the risky action and if = 0 it speci…es the safe action in state 2 . Indeed, in this case payo¤s are known and when = 1 agents agree that the best action choice in state 2 is the risky action (as R k > S k by assumption A1) and when = 0 they agree that the safe action is best (as
Another optimal contract is give discretion to one or both of agents over the action choice in state 2 . The agents'respective payo¤s are:
when the risky action is optimal, and
when the safe action is optimal.
To see that this is an equilibrium outcome note that since A and B's preferred actionplan is the same, when A o¤ers a contract requiring investment at date 0 and specifying his preferred action-plan, B is strictly better o¤ accepting the o¤er.
For the same reason, when A = B = 0, the agents sign a contract at date 0 agreeing to invest immediately and to take the risky action in state 2 , since k > S k under assumption
A1.
Importantly, in both cases there is no (strict) role for control rights and the initial contract fully speci…es the entire action-plan. 5 This is not surprising given that the two agents can write fully enforceable complete contracts.
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In contrast, as we shall show below, boundedly rational agents may agree on an incomplete contract, which leaves open the action choice in state 2 and gives control to one or both agents.
Full Disclosure
The typical contracting game considered in the literature boils down to a contract o¤er by the proposer followed by an accept/reject decision by the receiver. 7 The central new di¢ culty in our game is that both agents can learn something (privately) about their payo¤s between two rounds of o¤ers, so that the negotiation game can evolve into a game of incomplete information even though it starts out as a game of symmetric information. This is, we believe, an inevitable feature of any game of contracting between boundedly rational agents, 5 A contract giving full control to the proposer or the receiver may also be an equilibrium contract. However, this contract can never be strictly preferred to the optimal complete contract.
6 As is well known, when rational agents can write complete, state-contingent, fully enforceable contracts under symmetric information there is no role for control (see, e.g. Hart 1995, or Bolton and Dewatripont, 2005) .
7 If the contract is rejected the game ends and each party gets their reservation utility and if the contract is accepted the game proceeds to the implementation phase of the contract. who can each learn over time about their payo¤s in the contracting relation. It turns out, however, that the negotiation game reduces to a game of complete information under our twin assumptions that: i) any information learned can be credibly disclosed and, ii) that the two agents have congruent underlying preferences.
Lemma 1: Under assumptions A1 and A2, a strategy of revealing all new information to the other party is a subgame-perfect equilibrium strategy of the contracting game for each agent.
Proof: This observation follows immediately from the observations that: i) once the information is shared agents have fully congruent objectives under the stated assumptions;
and ii) not revealing what a party has learned can only delay the time at which payo¤s are received and cannot result in higher payo¤s. As each party gets strictly positive payo¤s (under assumption A1 ) it follows that immediate truthful disclosure is a weakly dominant strategy.
Complete Satis…cing Contracts
We refer to equilibrium contracts as satis…cing contracts to convey the idea that when contracting agents face positive deliberation costs they may agree on contracts in equilibrium that are satisfactory but not optimal from the perspective of rational agents who do not incur any deliberation costs. We begin by observing that when the value of thinking is high and the cost of delaying investment is low then satis…cing contracts will be complete.
Formally, a situation with a positive value of information and negative costs of delay is characterized by the following assumption on payo¤s.
The …rst inequality implies that both agents prefer to …nd out …rst which action is optimal before taking an action. Indeed, under full disclosure (Lemma 1), agent k expects to get b k when both agents set out to think ahead about which action is optimal, while if they immediately choose the preferred action given their prior belief agent k only gets k .
The second inequality implies that thinking ahead is not costly and in particular dominates the strategy of immediately investing and waiting for the realization of before thinking about what to do: under the strategy of thinking ahead of the realization of agent k 11 obtains:
while, under the strategy of investing immediately and thinking about the optimal action after the realization of 2 he gets:
The former is preferred to the latter strategy if and only if:
Under Assumption A3 this inequality always holds, since b < 1.
Both agents agree that in state 2 they will think before acting. Hence, the only advantage of postponing thinking until after 2 is realized is to avoid delaying investment should state 1 occur instead. However, under Assumption A3 the expected value of an investment that ends up in state 1 is negative.
Thus, thinking ahead of investing, and full disclosure is better for both agents than investing before thinking. This implies that an o¤er by A of either C A ; C B or C AB at date 0 would be dominated by a strategy of waiting and thinking before investing. Similarly, o¤ering to invest immediately at date 0 under contract C R is also dominated. Therefore the following proposition must hold.
Proposition 1: (Complete Satis…cing Contracts) Under assumptions A1, A2 and A3 the equilibrium of the contracting game involves thinking ahead of investing followed by the o¤er of either contracts C R or C S .
Proof: This follows immediately from the discussion above. An equilibrium strategy for the proposer is to wait and think until the agents have learned and communicated the optimal action. At that point agent A o¤ers C R if the risky action yields a higher payo¤ or C S if the safe action is preferred. Given A's strategy, B's best response is to think until she learns the optimal action, to disclose it to A if she learns it …rst, and to accept agent A's subsequent o¤er.
Incomplete Satis…cing Contracts
In contrast, when there is a cost of delaying investment one should expect satis…cing contracts to sometimes be incomplete. Such situations arise under the following assumption.
Indeed, delaying investment is costly when I < 2 . In light of our discussion above, it is easy to see that under this assumption the two agents are better o¤ investing immediately and postponing thinking about the optimal action until after the realization of state 2 .
Proposition 2: Under assumptions A1, A2 and A4 the equilibrium of the contracting game involves an immediate o¤er of either contracts C A ; C B or C AB . Either of these contracts is accepted by agent B. Following the realization of state 2 agents think about the optimal action and the controlling party selects the optimal action once it is identi…ed.
Proof: Under assumption A4 condition (3) is violated and therefore both agents prefer to invest at date 0 and think about the optimal action after the realization of 2 . Thus, an equilibrium strategy for A is to o¤er at date 0 either contracts C A ; C B or C AB , and to do the same in future periods should B reject the o¤er and should the agents remain uninformed.
Otherwise, if the agents learn the optimal action, o¤er either contracts C R or C S . Party B's best response to A's strategy is to accept A's o¤er at date 0.
Under assumption A4, the venture is so pro…table that the agents agree to a contract involving immediate investment so as to bring forward the time when they realize the returns from their investment. As they have congruent underlying preferences they do not care who has control, so that either control allocation C A ; C B or C AB can be an equilibrium outcome. However we next show that, even when the two agents have congruent underlying preferences, the indeterminacy over control allocations disappears when the two agents have di¤erent preferences over how much thinking to undertake before investing.
Con ‡icts over cautiousness and the allocation of control rights
We now consider situations in which the two agents disagree on how quickly to act and how much planning to undertake before investing. This is the case when assumption A5 holds. 13
Under this assumption A is impatient and prefers to invest immediately and to choose the risky action in state 2 . Agent B, on the other hand, is more cautious and prefers to take its time to think through what is the best action in state 2 . But note also that B is more intelligent or a faster thinker than A. This is why B wants to think before acting but not A.
We shall show that the equilibrium outcome of the contracting game between the two agents under these circumstances may be for the slower but more impatient party to relinquish control to the more patient party, paradoxically as a way of accelerating the implementation of the project. The intuition is that the more patient party may agree to an earlier implementation of the project if she has control, as control gives her the right to block hasty future decisions and thus allows her to defer thinking about future decisions to the time when they arise. As a result she is prepared to commit to the project sooner.
Proposition 3 Under Assumptions A1, A2, A5 and under condition
the equilibrium play is to o¤er immediately contract C B with probability y and C R with probability (1 y ), where y is given by:
When the reverse condition holds, agent A immediately o¤ers contract C R .
Proof: See the Appendix.
Corollary 1: If the more patient party (agent B) is the proposer then this party optimally retains full control.
Under condition (4) B prefers to reject contract o¤ers C R ; C S and C A , and to keep thinking ahead until she determines the optimal action in state 2 . But A would prefer to get B to agree to invest immediately. He can only do so if B has some guarantees not to be forced into a hasty decision in state 2 . Therefore he grants B some control rights by o¤ering either contracts C B or C AB with positive probability.
In other words, the impatient proposer prefers to leave the action choice in state 2 open and give up some control, to get the patient agent to commit to the project sooner and 14 refrain from spending too much time …ne tuning the details of the deal. By giving up control A gives B the option to …ne tune details later if needed, and thus avoids the opportunity cost of delaying investment.
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Propositions 2 and 3 are among our main results. Each proposition establishes …rst that in a world where complete contracts are fully enforceable, "boundedly rational"agents optimally choose to write incomplete contracts with control rights over future decisions left unspeci…ed in the contract. As in other models of incomplete contracts, Proposition 3 also establishes that the way control is allocated is in part driven by the agents relative bargaining strengths. Thus, the proposer tends to appropriate more control other things equal. But, remarkably, Proposition 3 further establishes that an impatient proposer may choose to give some control rights to the other more patient party, as a way of accelerating the closure of contract negotiations.
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There may also be more extreme situations where A has no choice but to wait until B has determined a complete action-plan. We describe a contracting situation below where party A is keen to close a deal immediately but B prefers to think ahead, and where equilibrium play is such that A completely caves in on B's demands and ends up writing an excessively complete contract (from A's perspective). This situation di¤ers from the one we have considered in the following way.
, and c) I > 2 8 Note that when Assumption A1 is not satis…ed we may have situations where:
That is, the two agents have non-congruent objectives ex ante, even though their underlying preferences are congruent. In such situations the logic of Proposition 3 still applies.
9 In situations where the transfer of control rights may not be legally enforceable, party B can still impose her preferred action. However, the optimal contract would then specify a complete action-plan ex ante. Thus, our analysis suggests, paradoxically, that a condition for the emergence of equilibrium incomplete contracts is that the legal infrastructure is su¢ ciently developed that the enforcement of control rights is possible.
10 Interestingly, this transfer of control would come at the cost of an e¢ ciency loss in the exercise of control by the patient party if the parties can only engage in cheap talk. As we explain in section 4.2, A might then always claim that the risky action is optimal no matter what he learns about the true underlying payo¤s. There would then be imperfect communication between the parties and therefore learning about payo¤s would be slower. Our assumption that the parties can communicate hard information thus plays an important role here.
As before, Assumptions A6.b and A6.c ensure that there is no opportunity cost in thinking ahead and delaying investment for B. At the same time, under Assumption A6.a A's preferred course of action remains investing immediately. However, although A makes contract proposals, the bargaining power is e¤ectively with B, who can credibly reject all o¤ers until after underlying payo¤s are known. In this situation the preferred outcome for A is to invest immediately and choose action r without thinking, while the worst outcome is to invest immediately and think after the realization of 2 . As for B, she prefers to think ahead to any other alternative. Remarkably, B in this situation fully gets her way even though she has no bargaining power.
Proposition 4: Under Assumptions A1, A2 and A6 agent A has no choice but to follow B's preferred path of action, which is to invest only after payo¤s in state 2 has been uncovered. When this is the case the equilibrium contract is either
Interestingly, the equilibrium outcome of the contracting game may in some sense be ine¢ cient, as the agents'joint welfare may be lower than under A's most preferred course of action. The reason is that B does not internalize A's opportunity cost of delayed investment and A is unable to compensate B to get her to accept A's preferred action.
Con ‡icting Underlying Objectives
How do con ‡icts over action choice a¤ect equilibrium contracting? In …rst generation models of incomplete contracting-in which contractual incompleteness is exogenously …xed-allocating control to the right agent is more important the more agents disagree on the choice of action (Aghion and Bolton, 1992) . In our setting instead, greater con ‡icts between agents are resolved through more complete contracts that generally give less discretion to the party in control. In other words, control is less relevant when there are greater con ‡icts between the parties. There are three related reasons why equilibrium contracts leave less room for discretion.
First, note that control rights may be as much a form of protection to the holder of the rights as a threat to the non-controlling party. Each party is concerned about potential abusive exercise of control by the other party and therefore may prefer to negotiate speci…c contractual guarantees rather than give up control.
Second, when the agents have con ‡icting goals they are likely to miscommunicate. That is, each party will have incentives to suppress information detrimental to itself but bene…cial to the other party. As a result, the agents will learn more slowly as a group and the value of information is reduced. The lower value of information in turn induces the contracting parties to do less …ne-tuning and to write coarser but more complete satis…cing contracts.
Third, because the holder of control rights may have to accept limits on the exercise of control (to get the other party to participate) the value of control is reduced. Therefore, again, agents may prefer to sign a coarse and more complete contract rather than leaving the choice of actions in some states of nature open to be determined later.
Note …nally that the agents are less likely to miscommunicate as long as they have not signed any contract and are free to walk away from the deal. The reason is simply that they are then less concerned about disclosing information that might be used against them.
For these reasons, anticipated future con ‡icts introduce a bias towards thinking ahead or no thinking at all, which leads to more complete satis…cing contracts.
To focus on the consequences of non-congruent underlying objectives we assume that the agents always disagree on which action is best under complete information:
Although the agents disagree on what to do under complete information we shall for the most part continue to assume that their ex-ante expected payo¤s remain aligned. That is, we shall maintain Assumption A1, which states that both agents prefer the risky action over the safe action under their common prior beliefs . 
Miscommunication and the lower value of control
Consider …rst the situation where the con ‡ict is so severe that each party is better o¤ liquidating the venture ex post than have its least preferred action chosen. Moreover, one party's least preferred action is the other party's most preferred action. Such a situation arises whenever the following assumption holds:
Assumption A8: R A < 0 and R B < 0.
We shall refer to this situation as one where the exercise of control is abusive. The reason is that Assumptions A7 and A8 together imply that any party in control in state 2 takes an action that produces a negative payo¤ for the non-controlling party, a worse outcome than inaction which yields a zero payo¤.
Recall that when both agents have congruent underlying objectives the net value for agent k of determining the optimal action choice in state 2 (when this choice is left to be determined after state 2 arises) is given by
This value can be obtained through the parallel thinking e¤orts of the two agents combined with full communication of any information obtained by the two agents.
When there are underlying con ‡icts among the two agents, the value of thinking before acting in state 2 is generally lower, as the agents no longer "share all their thoughts"when they have con ‡icting goals and stop fully communicating what they have learned.
The Dynamics of Communication and Learning
The non-controlling party is understandably reluctant to disclose information to the controlling party that could be used against her. Thus, consider the situation the agents face under contract C A when they are uninformed in state 2 .
Suppose …rst that B learns R k = R k . She then prefers to postpone the time when the risky action is chosen by A (as she then gets a discounted negative payo¤ R B ). She therefore suppresses this information and reports that she did not learn anything. Hence, A can only discover this payo¤ on his own with probability A . Note, however, that if A learns nothing after one round of thought experimentation (with probability 1 A ) and B reports nothing, A updates his estimate of Pr(R k = R k ) from his prior (1 ) to
Similarly, after rounds of experimentation in which A has learned nothing and B has reported nothing, A's posterior belief that R k = R k becomes
which converges to 1. Clearly then, after a su¢ ciently long run of unsuccessful trials it is optimal for A to stop experimenting and to choose the risky action.Agent A's optimal stopping time A and posterior A are such that A is indi¤erent between taking the risky action immediately or continuing thinking for one more round:
(we ignore integer constraints for simplicity).
Although B does not disclose anything A still learns something from B's silence. Even if A cannot tell for sure what the true payo¤ of the risky action is, when his beliefs have been updated to the point where he estimates that the risky action yields a payo¤ R A with probability A , agent A is better o¤ stopping to think further and choosing the risky action.
Suppose next that B learns R k = R k . Although B is less reluctant to disclose this information-for then A responds by choosing the safe action with a positive payo¤ S B for B-she may still choose to withhold that R k = R k . The reason is that by withholding this information she may be able to induce A to choose the risky action (a preferred choice as R B > S B under Assumption A7). More precisely, when A's beliefs are near A (so that A prefers to stop if he remains uninformed about the optimal action) B is better o¤ withholding the information that R k = R k . But when A's belief is small, then A prefers to continue thinking when uninformed, in which case B's best response is to disclose R k , so as to bring forward the time when A chooses the safe action.
Thus, the strategic di¢ culty in this situation is that B's best response varies with A's belief . Moreover, A's best response also depends on B's disclosure policy. When A's belief is near A , A prefers to stop thinking if he expects B to disclose R k = R k , but to continue thinking if he expects B to withhold R k = R k .
In short, a pure strategy equilibrium in stopping times and disclosure strategies cannot exist in this situation. However, as the next lemma establishes, a mixed strategy equilibrium always exists.
We denote by b the …rst time at which A's beliefs b are such that A prefers to continue thinking if B stops disclosing R k at time b 1, but to stop if B only stops disclosing R k at time b .
Lemma 2: Under Assumptions A7 and A8, when the agents are uninformed in state 2 the only equilibrium under contract contract C A that exists is a mixed strategy equilibrium, where both A randomizes between stopping and continuing to think and B randomized between disclosing and stopping to disclose R k at any time b + 1.
Coarse Contracts
As the value of thinking before acting in state 2 is lower when there are underlying con ‡icts among the two agents, the ex-ante value of leaving decisions to be …ne-tuned when the state of nature arises is also lower. The implication, as we show here, is that the two agents may prefer not to …ne-tune their action choice and to write a complete contract with a coarse action-plan. We refer to such contracts as coarse contracts.
Given that the agents do not cooperate in thinking through the best plan of action in state 2 the value of control for A under contract C A is now no more than
(note that since A is indi¤erent between stopping or continuing thinking at b his payo¤ at b is given by b R A + (1 b )R A ). The main di¢ culty in our analysis here is the characterization of the …rst stopping time b . However, for some parameter values we can establish that A prefers to stop thinking right away -so that b = 0-even if thinking is optimal if the agents cooperate. This is so if:
which can rewritten as:
To side-step the di¢ culty of characterizing the optimal …rst stopping time b in general, we restrict attention to parameter values for which b = 0. Thus, we assume henceforth, Assumption A9:
: 12 12 Note that, since
there are situations under assumption A8 where both b A > A and condition (5) hold.
Recall that when assumption A4 holds (that is b k > k and I < 2 ) and when the agents have congruent underlying preferences, then satis…cing contracts are incomplete and assign control to one or both agents (Proposition 2). In contrast, as we show below, when the agents have non-congruent preferences they will sign a complete but coarse contract under the same circumstances.
We have already established that under Assumption A9, A cannot do better under contract C A than under contract C R . Similarly, when the agents sign contract C AB in this situation, the best they can do is not to think and instead immediately choose the risky action in state 2 . The value of thinking is even lower than under contract C A , as a complete stalemate arises once the agents know the true payo¤ R k and learn that they fundamentally disagree on the action choice. Therefore an additional reason why the risky action is chosen when the agents do not know the true payo¤ R k is that each party knows that by engaging in thought experimentation they run the risk of a stalemate.
Proposition 5: Under Assumptions A1, A4, A7, A8 and A9 agent A (weakly) prefers the coarse contract C R at date 0 to contracts C A , C B or C AB , and therefore there is no equilibrium in which an incomplete contract is proposed and accepted.
Under the assumptions of Proposition 5, incomplete contracts cannot be equilibrium contracts. This is entirely due to the agents' extremely non-congruent objectives. As we have shown in the previous section, if the agents had congruent preferences then under Assumption A4 they would prefer to sign an incomplete contract. Here, the agents prefer to commit to a coarse action-plan rather than leave things to be …ne-tuned later, as they anticipate that they will face ex-post miscommunication ine¢ ciencies. Miscommunication, in turn, reduces the value of thinking and …ne-tuning ex post to the point that the agents prefer not to think and instead to stick to a coarse action plan.
Note that, although incomplete contracts are (weakly) dominated here, it is not obvious whether a complete coarse contract or a complete state-contingent contract is optimal. More precisely, it is not clear whether the agents will immediately sign contract C R or whether they will think …rst and then sign a complete state-contingent contract. Indeed, despite their non-congruent objectives the agents may prefer to put their di¤erences aside and collaborate in working out a state-contingent action-plan before committing to invest. Agent B prefers the coarse contract C R , since under a state-contingent action-plan A imposes the risky action when it is detrimental to B and the safe action when B stands to bene…t from the risky action:
Agent A also prefers the coarse contract C R if the opportunity cost of delaying investment ( 2 I) is high, and otherwise prefers to think before investing.
Suppose that B's participation constraint does not bind:
As we have established in the previous section, under Assumptions A4 and A10, agents with congruent preferences agree on the incomplete contract C A . In contrast, here, with extreme non-congruent preferences such that Assumption A8 holds, either the coarse contract C R is signed at date 0, or both agents think ahead before signing a contract.
Proposition 6: Under Assumptions A1, A4, A7, A8, A9 and A10, a cuto¤ I < 2 exists such that in equilibrium agents think ahead before committing to invest in the venture if I I. Otherwise, A and B sign the coarse contract C R at date 0.
The agents prefer to agree on a complete contract, because their con ‡icting objectives undermine future cooperation and, thus, reduce the bene…ts of postponing some decisions.
At the same time, the allocation of control rights is too blunt an instrument, since the controlling party can exploit the non-controlling party.
Note …nally that when Assumption A9 does not hold a complete contract can still emerge (provided I is large enough) even though the agents would have chosen an incomplete contract had their objectives been congruent.
The need to compromise reduces the value of planning ahead
In this section, we consider a situation where the agents are best o¤ thinking ahead of investing. We show that there will be no miscommunication in equilibrium as long as the agents are not committed to the venture. Nevertheless, the need to compromise to makethe venture acceptable to both agents may reduce the value of information su¢ ciently that the agents end up preferring a coarse, complete contract to a complete state-contingent contract. Similarly, the need to reduce discretion of the controlling party may reduce the value of control su¢ ciently that the agents prefer a coarse complete contract.
Under Assumption A3 ( b k > k and I > 2 ) each agent would prefer to think before choosing an action, provided it could choose its preferred action and agents share their thoughts. In addition, since I > 2 , each agent would prefer this thinking to take place ahead of investing. Under con ‡icting preferences, however, agents cannot both implement their preferred action. Only the controlling party may be able to do so. Even though Assumption A3 holds, the non-controlling party may well prefer not to engage in any planning. To get the non-controlling party to accept a contract where it has no control, the controlling party may then need to constrain its own discretion. But as we show below, while limiting its discretion the controlling party may in turn prefer not to engage in any planning and instead sign a complete but coarse contract.
To illustrate this observation we assume that the con ‡ict among the agents is so severe that, if the agents think ahead of investing and learn that R k = R k , B prefers to stay out of the venture rather than agreeing to A's preferred action:
Here, to get B to participate A must commit not to implement the risky action in state 2 with a probability exceeding x given by:
Note that, unlike in the situation when the parties have already made their investments and are uninformed in state 2 , there will be no miscommunication when the agents think before they commit to the venture. The reason is that the worst outcome for either party before investment takes place is to obtain a payo¤ of zero by walking away from the venture.
Therefore, a (weak) best response for B is to always disclose R k . And given that B always discloses R k , it is also a best response to always disclose R k . The reason is that if B does not disclose R k , A only stops learning when his beliefs are su¢ ciently close to 1, in which case he chooses the safe action. But then B is only delaying the time when she obtains S B
by not disclosing R k .
Still, even though agents share their thoughts, the value of information may be su¢ ciently reduced for A (when he needs to compromise), that he prefers to immediately settle on the 23 risky action without thinking. If A ends up choosing the safe action most of the timewhenever R k = R k , and with probability (1 x ) when R k = R k -what is the point of engaging in time-consuming thinking?
Another di¢ culty here is that after one period of thinking the agents bargain under incomplete information. Thus, if A makes an o¤er C R in any period t 1, B may suspect that A actually knows that R k = R k .
Proposition 7: Under Assumptions A1, A3, A7, A8, A9 and A11, an o¤er C R from A at t = 0 is an equilibrium of the contracting game when
is close enough to zero.
When agents attempt to write down a detailed plan of action, they also learn that they have fundamental di¤erences. The need to compromise then reduces the value of information and will result in less …ne-tuned contracts. A coarse contract is also a compromise but one where the cost of thinking is avoided. Here a deal is quickly concluded because this is an e¢ cient resolution of the agents con ‡icting objectives, avoiding lengthy and ultimately sterile negotiations.
Preliminary contracts
So far we have restricted attention to …ve main contracts. But there is also a sixth contract, which we refer to as a preliminary contract which can be an equilibrium contract. Under this contract, which we denote by C , the agents agree to …rst think ahead of investing and are committed to an action contingent on R k .
This contract may be preferred to the coarse contract C R because it yields higher expected payo¤s by committing the agents to participate even when an agent's ex-post participation constraint does not hold. More precisely, the preliminary contract can secure B's participation ex ante, and thus relax the ex-post participation constraint,
A preliminary contract can then raise A's value from thinking ahead while guaranteeing B's participation. However, to be acceptable to B the preliminary contract must guaranteeB a su¢ ciently high expected payo¤ in state 2 even though A gets to choose the risky action with a higher probability than x .
To illustrate this possibility while keeping the analysis simple we shall consider the special situation where B is unable to think, so that B = 0.
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Consider the following preliminary contract C o¤ered by A to B at t = 0: a) the agents commit to invest once they have discovered the value of R k ; b) if R k = R k , action r is chosen in state 2 ; c) if R k = R k , action s is chosen with probability and action r with probability (1 ) in state 2 , where solves agent B's participation constraint at date 0.
We shall show that this contract may be strictly preferred by A to C R and that B accepts this o¤er under the assumptions of Proposition 7, but when
is close to 1. Indeed, when x is close to 1 the agents prefer to think ahead and settle on either contract C S or C x rather than immediately agree on C R . But we shall show that in this case the agents can do even better by signing a preliminary contract under two additional assumptions.
This preliminary contract, o¤ered before the agents have thought through their action in state 2 , allows them to e¤ectively transfer payo¤s across states of nature and thus achieve a higher ex-ante expected payo¤, as with an insurance contract. Although they are both risk neutral, there are gains from such an agreement by letting the agents trade commitments to choosing the risky action in situations when it is not their most preferred action. In this way the agents can make ex-post non-transferable utilities partially transferable ex ante.
The role of a preliminary contract is, thus, to overcome a form of Hirshleifer e¤ect, where information eliminates insurance or trading opportunities and thus results in a decline in exante utility. Here, as the agents'information changes over time, so does the intensity of the con ‡icts that oppose them. Absent a preliminary contract, B will be unwilling to invest when it expects to get R B in state 2 : Under the veil-of-ignorance concerning agents'true payo¤s, they are able to …nd room for agreements they would not be able to reach once the information is revealed.
13 When B > 0 agent B's thinking also contributes to the contracting parties aggregate learning capacity. In this situation the analysis is more complex as B has incentives not to share her thoughts. The preliminary contract must then generally also specify a stopping time when the parties are committed to invest.
Suppose that in addition to Assumptions A1, A3, A7, A8, and A11, the following additional assumptions hold: Assumption A12:
and, Assumption A13:
Then we are then able to establish:
Proposition 8: Under the same Assumptions as in Proposition 7 and Assumptions A12
and A13, and provided that
is su¢ ciently close to 1, the unique subgame-perfect equilibrium is such that:
i) A o¤ers a preliminary contract to B at t = 0 with the following terms: a) the agents commit to invest once they have thought through R k ; b) if R k = R k then action r is chosen in state 2 ; c) if R k = R k then action s is chosen with probability and action r with probability (1 ) in state 2 , where is given by:
ii) both agents think ahead and share their thoughts.
Under Assumption A12, A strictly prefers the preliminary contract to thinking ahead and settling on either contracts C S or C x . Moreover, under assumption A3 both agents prefer the preliminary contract to C R given that x is close to 1. Finally, under the contract both agents prefer to think and share their thoughts, as no investment can take place unless they discover value of R k .
Extensions
This section explores two extensions to our basic setup.
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Cheap talk
We have assumed that agents'thoughts are hard information. This may be realistic in some situations (e.g. a mathematical proof) but less so in others. Here we examine the opposite case in which thoughts are soft information so that communication is pure cheap talk. Most of our qualitative results extend to this case.
With cheap talk there is inevitably more miscommunication than with disclosure of hard information. First, when agents disagree about how cautiously to proceed there is now some miscommunication. Second, under extreme non-congruent preferences over actions miscommunication is now total, while before it was only partial.
Under congruent objectives, however, agents trust each others's reports and communication is unimpaired. A result similar to Lemma 1, with the addition of Assumption A3, can be established, and Propositions 1 and 2 continue to hold.
Thus, consider …rst the situation where the agents may disagree on how cautiously to proceed. We show below that even though cheap talk allows for miscommunication, a result analogous to Proposition 3 and Corollary 1 obtains under slightly di¤erent conditions.
The problem under cheap talk is that the more patient agent can no longer trust the more impatient one to tell the truth. Since the impatient agent prefers to choose the risky action without thinking further, it will always pretend that it has found that the risky action has a payo¤ R k when it has not discovered anything. The impatient agent is thus credible only when reporting R k = R k .
Suppose again that A is impatient and prefers the risky action in state 2 without thinking further, while B prefers to think before acting. Miscommunication then has two opposing e¤ects. On the one hand, B's threat to reject all o¤ers until she has thought through R k is less credible, because miscommunication slows down the agents'joint thinking, thus reducing the value of thinking ahead. On the other hand, the value of control for B is reduced for the same reason. On net, although B is more likely to accept a contract without control rights, when she does require control to sign on, she demands more control than when thoughts are hard information.
More formally, assume that beginning at date t = 0, A makes repeated o¤ers of C R , which B rejects to gain time to think about R k . Following each rejection both agents think and engage in cheap talk. As we have observed, A reports R k both when this is the true payo¤ and when he learns nothing, and he truthfully reports R k . As for B, she truthfully shares her thoughts.
Therefore, when A reports R k , B believes this is true and accepts A's o¤er C S . In contrast, when A reports R k , B only updates her belief t . After t rounds of communication of R k , her posterior belief is:
Thus, B's beliefs t converge to 1. In other words, it dawns on B that A has learned that R k = R k . Following a su¢ ciently long sequence of announcements of R k , B therefore …nds it optimal to stop rejecting A's o¤ers of C R . At her optimal stopping time, denoted by t B , B is indi¤erent between accepting C R and and thinking for one more period. That is, her posterior t B is such that:
Although con ‡icts over cautiousness may be reduced if miscommunication slows down thinking, they do not disappear. Formally, Assumption A5 must be replaced by Assumption
A5b below to re ‡ect the change in expected discounted payo¤s resulting from miscommunication. Denoting agent k's payo¤ (k = A; B) when both agents think before choosing the optimal action in state 2 by:
then Assumption A5b is as follows:
Denoting by Y B agent B's payo¤ when both agents think ahead of investing:
]; 28 then we are able to establish the following analog of Proposition 3 for the contracting game with cheap talk.
Proposition 3b Under Assumptions A1, A2, A5b and under condition
in equilibrium A o¤ers immediately C B with probability y and C R with probability (1 y ), where y is given by:
When the reverse condition holds, A immediately o¤ers contract C R .
Proof: Omitted.
Similarly, a result analogous to Proposition 4, which we omit, can be established under modi…ed conditions to re ‡ect miscommunication.
Now consider situations where the two agents disagree about the choice of action (Assumption A7 holds). In this case, communication breaks down completely, as each agent has a strict incentive to mislead the other. As a result, the two agents think by themselves and duplicate their cognitive e¤orts. Results analogous to Propositions 5, 6 and 7 obtain again under modi…ed conditions to account for the slower thinking. The key di¤erence with the previous analysis is that the parameter region for which equilibrium contracts are coarse is larger.
Lemma 3: When the equilibrium contract under hard information is a coarse contract, it is also the equilibrium contract when information is soft.
Proof: The agents'payo¤s under a coarse contract are the same whether information is hard or soft. Indeed, no thinking is involved. Moreover, any other contract o¤er that involves some thinking cannot result in a higher payo¤ for A under soft information than under hard information. It therefore follows that if C R is an equilibrium o¤er at t = 0 when information is hard it must also be an equilibrium o¤er when information is soft.
Finally, another di¤erence with the case with hard information is that negotiations may last forever even when A has thought through R k . Indeed, by repeating over and over again the same information, A is unable to persuade B that his information is reliable. Since B's beliefs do not change, A does not have a …nite stopping time. This, in turn, reduces the value of a preliminary contract. 29
Transferable utility
We assume now that utility is fully transferable through (state-contingent) monetary payments. In this case, a preliminary contract has even greater bene…ts. Indeed, by …rst specifying the broad terms of the deal, such a contract aligns the agents'objectives, leading them to agree on how much thinking should precede investment. Hence, they will more readily accept to invest without having worked out a complete action-plan.
Lemma 4 (The Congruence Principle): It is weakly optimal for the agents to sign a preliminary contract establishing how the agents will share the pro…ts.
Once the agents have agreed on pro…t-sharing, their objectives are fully congruent, and communication is perfect whether thoughts are hard or soft information. Therefore, the contracting problem reduces to determining the team's optimal plan of action. Any actions that the contracting agents determine by thinking ahead will be speci…ed in the contract and any decisions to be determined at the time when they arise will be taken jointly by the two agents.
Strictly speaking, there is no need for contracts beyond the preliminary agreement. Note, however, that under even a very small risk of change in one of the agents'preferences resulting in a con ‡ict ex-post, the agents would strictly prefer to explicitly spell out what future action choices they have agreed to in a contract. For the same reason the agents would strictly prefer to specify a governance structure that de…nes the process by which future decisions are taken.
With only one state of nature ( 2 ) where some thinking is needed, the contracting problem with transferable utility collapses to a simple decision problem of the type studied in Bolton and Faure-Grimaud (2008) . When thinking is required in more than one state of nature (e.g. in state 1 ) the team problem is of independent interest as it raises a number of organizational design questions. For instance, an interesting set of questions is who in the team should think about what problem? Is the team more e¢ cient when both agents think about the same problem at the same time, or rather when they specialize and engage in parallel thinking? The analysis of these issues is beyond the scope of this paper and is left for future research.
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Conclusion
We have proposed and explored a …rst contracting model between two agents facing timedeliberation costs. In this model, equilibrium contracts may be endogenously incomplete.
Control rights assigned to one of the parties allow the controlling agent to defer timeconsuming deliberations to a later date without exposing her to too much uncertainty. As she will be in charge of the decisions most critical to her, she need to worry too much and unduly prolong negotiations at the initial contracting stage.
However, when agents face potentially major con ‡icts they tend to resolve these up-front, by writing more complete initial contracts. This more complete contract may be either a more state-contingent or a coarser contract. Thus con ‡icts among contracting agents tend to result in excessively complete contracts from the perspective of joint payo¤ maximization.
Equilibrium contracts in our model are incomplete for two reasons: …rst, the costs of thinking about how to complete them may exceed the expected bene…ts; and second, the costs of thinking about how to outwit the other agent also exceed the expected bene…ts.
In contrast to …rst generation incomplete contracting models, contracts are not incomplete due to exogenously given enforcement constraints. Indeed, we have assumed that all statecontingent transactions are fully enforceable. Instead, contractual incompleteness is due to the limited imagination of the contracting agents.
We believe that this set-up lends itself naturally to the analysis of contractual innovation.
Over time new contracting agents can learn from past contracts and may innovate relative to existing contracts, even if the legal environment remains unchanged. Also, in our setup the law has other roles than just an enforcement role, and contract law does not simply reduce to the enforcement of a freedom of contracting regime. Courts and trade associations can add value by specifying default rules or contracts, which e¤ectively reduce transaction costs for new contracting agents. Indeed, Chakraborty and MacLeod (2008) argue that the American Institute of Architects standard form contracts for construction projects, which have evolved over a long period of time, indeed provide an e¢ cient default contract for complex construction projects that is readily available to any contracting parties in the construction business. They also show that a central feature of these contracts is the inclusion of control rights and governance structures that determine the ex post bargaining power of parties.
Similarly, by putting constraints on the exercise of control rights, courts can reduce the risk of abusive control and thereby allow contracting agents to sign more e¢ cient incomplete 31
contracts. In the absence of such constraints the equilibrium outcome of the contracting game may be that both parties end up wasting a lot of time …ne-tuning the contract before investing, while with legal limits on the exercise of control the parties may end up agreeing on an incomplete contract much more quickly. A fuller exploration of these implications and ideas are left for future research.
of the risky action are unknown, either the proposer o¤ers her most preferred contract, or the receiver gets U R min = b U RF I .
Proof: Suppose again this is not true. As in the proof of Claim 1, it then follows that the receiver must be indi¤erent at any date t between accepting or rejecting the o¤er that gives the receiver some utility level e U R t > U R min . In particular, it then must be the case that
; then e U R t = 1 (1 ) U RF I = b U RF I ; a contradiction. Alternatively, iterating the same the argument, we would …nd that
which, when e U R t > U R min requires e U R t+ to go to in…nity when goes to in…nity. Again, this leads to a contradiction.
We now make use of these observations to establish Proposition 3.
Note …rst that under assumptions A2 and A4 party B's minimum guaranteed payo¤ is
If condition (4) in Proposition 3 does not hold, so that
then the proposer's most preferred contract-C R -gives a higher expected payo¤ to B than U B min . Therefore B's best response is to accept this o¤er. Now suppose that condition (4) holds. Then, from claim 1, the receiver gets exactly U B min in equilibrium.
To complete the proof of proposition 3 it remains to show that the stochastic contract o¤er that gives A the highest possible payo¤ while guaranteeing U B min to B, takes the form described in the proposition, namely that both agents agree to invest immediately, party B gets control with probability y and the risky action is chosen in state 2 with probability (1 y ).
There are several types of stochastic contracts that can implement U B min . A …rst contract is to give full control to party B (draw contract C B ) with probability y and to take the 35 risky action in state 2 with probability (1 y). 14 An alternative o¤er is to give B control in every period with some probability z and to take the risky action in state 2 with probability (1 z). As we show below these two contracts are in fact equivalent. To see this, note that under the latter contract party k expects to receive:
Now setting
(Note also that there is no loss of generality in considering only stationary strategies z t = z for all t).
We now characterise the highest payo¤ available to A under the constraint that B gets U B min . Agent A's control variables are the probability x of engaging in thinking ahead before investing and the probability y of engaging in thinking on the spot in state 2 before chosing an action. Therefore agent A is looking for the solution to the constrained maximization program:
Other contracts that involve for instance choosing the safe action before learning whether it is optimal or, choosing the sub-optimal action once agents have learned which action is best are dominated for both agents and cannot therefore maximize A's payo¤ under the constraint that B obtains at least U B min .
Forming the Lagrangian, and taking its partial derivatives with respect to x and y we obtain that:
where @L @x (resp.
@L @y
) is the partial derivative of the Lagrange function with respect to x (resp. y) and # is the Lagrange multiplier of the constraint.
From the last inequality it is apparent that the solution to this program is x = 0 and y 2 (0; 1) if and only if:
which is true under assumptions A2 to A4. This establishes that the most e¢ cient way for A to deviate from his preferred course of action is to invest right away, to choose the risky action in state 2 with probability (1 y ) and to think on the spot with probability y .
This action-plan is implemented by o¤ering party B control with probability y , as party B
would then want to think on the spot in state 2 . Finally, the exact value of y is given by:
To summarize, the following strategies support this subgame-perfect equilibrium:
-Equilibrium strategy for A : at date 0, o¤er a stochastic contract committing to immediate investment and that implements C R with probability 1 y and C B with probability y . If the contract is accepted, invest at date 0 and if state 2 is realized and A has control, implement decision r. If B has control, think and credibly reveal any new information to B.
If the o¤er is rejected, think and again credibly reveal any new information to B. If A uncovers the optimal decision in state 2 reveal it to B and o¤er the …rst-best optimal complete contract to B (either C R or C S depending on whether A uncovers that r or s is optimal). Similarly, if B reveals the optimal decision in state 2 o¤er the …rst-best complete contract to B.
If A learns nothing during that second sub-period of period 0 (from his own thinking or from B) repeat at date 1 the same strategy as at date 0 and continue doing so until investment takes place.
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15 Note that nothing is changed if party A o¤ers initially C A instead of C r ; or C instead of C B .
-Equilibrium strategy for B : at date 0, accept all contract o¤ers with immediate investment that take support in CnfC S g, provided that those o¤ers put a weight of at least y on the choice of C B . In state 2 , when B has control think on the spot and implement the optimal decision. Following a rejection at date 0, think in the second sub-period of date 0 and reveal any information to A. Then accept all …rst-best complete contract o¤ers.
Similarly, if A reveals that decision s (resp. r) is optimal in state 2 , accept all …rst-best complete contract o¤ers. If neither party learns anything, repeat at date 1 the same strategy as at date 0 and continue doing so until a contract is accepted.
Proof of Corollary 1: immediate from previous results and noticing that now necessarily under A2 to A4,
Therefore, the proposer B must obtain her most preferred path of action, i.e. C B :
Proof of Proposition 4: Note that under assumption A6.b and A6.c, U
is the highest attainable payo¤ for B. From claim 2 above, this must be her equilibrium payo¤. Also, under assumption A6.a thinking ahead of investing is costly for A and is not his most preferred strategy.
Lemma 2: Under Assumptions A7 and A8, when the agents are uninformed in state 2 under contract contract C A the only equilibrium that exists is a mixed strategy equilibrium, where both A and B randomize between stopping and not stopping at any time b + 1.
Proof of Lemma 2:
We begin by showing that a pure strategy equilibrium cannot exist. To see this, note that withholding all information (whether
from time onwards is a best response for B whenever:
where we de…ne A's stopping time A under the assumption that B always discloses R k up to time A .
But if B stops disclosing R k at some earlier time , A's optimal stopping time in turn may change, as A can then no longer update his beliefs after time . Let B and B respectively denote the time when B stops disclosing R k and A's belief at time B . Also, let
; then we have either:
That is, it is best for A to either stop thinking at time B , or to continue thinking until he learns the optimal action.
In the latter situation we have A 7 ! 1 so that (8) no longer holds and B's best response is to disclose R k at time B . Similarly, in the former situation, we have A = B , but if this is anticipated B's best response is to stop disclosing R k even earlier. In sum, whether (10) holds or not, a pure strategy equilibrium in stopping times does not exist.
There exists a mixed strategy equilibrium, as we now establish, where both A and B randomize between stopping and not stopping at any time b + 1. Time b is the …rst time when b is such that
If we denote by the probability that A stops thinking at any time b and by ' 1 the probability that B stops disclosing R k at 1 then for any the following two equations must hold in equilibrium. For A we must have:
Similarly, for party B we must have:
or,
In other words, for any , B must be indi¤erent between stopping disclosing R k at + 1 or at . If B stops at + 1 (and therefore discloses R k in period ) she gets S B at . If she does not disclose R k at , then A discovers R k at with probability A , in which case B gets again S B . With probability (1 A ), A does not discover R k and stops with probability , in which case B gets R B ; and …nally with probability (1 ) party A continues learning, in which case B's continuation value is S B (as B discloses R k at + 1).
As can be readily checked, these equations admit a unique solution 2 [0; 1] and ' 1 2 [0; 1] under Assumptions A7 and A8.
Proposition 5: Under Assumptions A1, A4, A7, A8 and A9 agent A (weakly) prefers the coarse contract C R at date 0 to contracts C A , C B or C AB , and therefore there is an equilibrium in which no incomplete contract is proposed and accepted.
Proof of Proposition 5:
Under assumption A8 and A9 C R is (weakly) preferred by both agents to C A . In addition under assumptions A1 and A7, C R is also preferred by A to C S which is again preferred by A to C B as S A > V and where B is similarly de…ned as b but with A's and B's roles interchanged.
Also, C R is (weakly) preferred by both agents to C AB . Finally, by Claim 2 in the Appendix, C B will not be o¤ered in equilibrium even when B prefers C B to C R .
Proposition 6: Under Assumptions A1, A4, A7, A8, A9 and A10, a cuto¤ I < 2 exists such in equilibrium: If I I agents think ahead before commiting to invest in the venture; Otherwise, A and B sign the coarse contract C R at date 0.
Proof of Proposition 6:
The cuto¤ I is de…ned by equating A's expected payo¤s under the two contracting strategies. By o¤ering the coarse contract C R at date 0 party A gets:
And by …rst thinking ahead and o¤ering a complete contingent contract A gets:
given that Assumption A9 holds. The cuto¤ I is then de…ned by:
To see that an o¤er of C R at date 0-which is accepted by B-is an equilibrium when I < I, note …rst that under Assumptions A7, A8 and A9, an o¤er of C R at date 0 provides a higher payo¤ than C A , C B or C AB to both A and B (as established in Proposition 5).
Moreover, when I I, both agents are also better o¤ signing C R at date 0 than thinking ahead. Therefore, B will accept an o¤er of C R at date 0 and A will indeed o¤er C R .
Finally, when I 2 [I; 2 ), A is better o¤ delaying a contract o¤er and thinking ahead if B also thinks and shares her thoughts. Similarly, B's best response to A thinking ahead is to also think ahead and share her thoughts.
Proof of Proposition 7: Given their prior beliefs both agents prefer the risky to the safe action under assumption A1. Agent A can make an o¤er C R at t = 0 and have B accept it when it is common knowledge that none of the players are informed.
We shall assume that B has pessimistic out-of-equilibrium beliefs and that if a contract is not immediately accepted at time t = 0, B believes that A knows that R k = R k when he makes an o¤er C R and therefore B rejects any o¤er C R past period 0 given Assumption
A11.
Thus after t = 0, A can no longer get an o¤er C R accepted by B. Under Assumption A11, the only o¤ers B will accept after time t = 0 are C S and contract C x , where r ischosen with probability x de…ned in equation (6) and s is chosen with probability (1 x ) when R k = R k . Therefore, A's payo¤ when thinking ahead of investing is at most
which is dominated by A's payo¤ under contract o¤er C R at time t = 0:
when x is low enough, by Assumption A1.
Moreover, under Assumption A8 and A9 A weakly prefers contract C R to C A .
i) A o¤ers a preliminary contract to B at t = 0 with the following terms: a) the agents commit to invest once they have thought through R k ; b) if R k = R k then action r is chosen in state 2 ; c) if R k = R k then action s is chosen with probability and action r with probability (1 ) in state 2 , where is given by: Di¤erentiating with respect to we observe that the coe¢ cient with respect to is strictly positive under Assumption A12, which means that A would like to set as high as possible and x as low as possible. The best contract for A is then obtained by setting x = 0.
Third, A and B prefer the preliminary contract to C R under Assumption A3 given that
x is close to 1, as they then already prefer to think ahead and settle on contracts C S and C x to signing C R .
Fourth, A's continuation best-response following acceptance of contract C is to think ahead, for no investment can take place unless A reveals the value of R k .
Fifth, A is clearly better o¤ disclosing R k under Assumptions A1 and A7. He is also better o¤ disclosing R k under Assumption A13.
Finally, under Assumptions A8 and A9 the agents weakly prefer C R to C A , but C R in turn is dominated by C when x is close to 1.
Lemma 4 (The Congruence Principle): it is weakly optimal for the contracting agents to begin by signing a preliminary agreement which establishes how the agents will share the pro…ts from the venture.
Proof of Lemma 4: Let j l 2 fR k ; R k ; ?g denote the payo¤s communicated by agent j = A; B to the other agent up to time l, and let I( j t ) denote an investment plan specifying a (possibly random) time t contingent on the payo¤s communicated by the agents up to time t, at which investment is sunk. Also, let fa( ; j ( ) )g denote a plan to take action a( ; 
